2 In respondent Shannon’s case, the Bankruptcy Court determined that by retaining Shannon’s vehicle and demanding payment, the City also had violated §§362(a)(4) and (a)(6). 2 v. FULTON CHICAGO Opinion of the Court . 18-2527 (7th Cir. . 11 U. S. C. §362(a)(3). Chicago seized the cars of three individuals for unpaid tickets or for driving on a license suspended for unpaid tickets. §§362(a)(4), (6); see, e.g., In re Kuehn, 563 F. 3d 289, 294 (CA7 2009) (holding that a university’s refusal to provide a transcript to a student-debtor “was an act to collect a debt” that violated the automatic stay). The court concluded that “by retaining possession of the debtors’ vehicles after they declared bankruptcy,” the City had acted “to exercise control over” respondents’ property in violation of §362(a)(3). Specifically, Section 542(a) contains exceptions that Section 362(a)(3) lacks, and nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended Section 362(a)(3) to command immediate turnover of estate property. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. of Oral Arg. Chicago v. Fulton: Everything You Need to Know about the January 2021 SCOTUS Decision. Dynamically explore and compare data on law firms, companies, individual lawyers, … But transforming the stay in §362 into an affirmative turnover obligation would have constituted an important change. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition has certain immediate consequences. are met.” Brief for Petitioner 37. But it would be “an odd construction” of §362(a)(3) to require a creditor to do immediately what §542 specifically excuses. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Time Intervals in Months From Filing to Closing of Adversary Proceedings Filed Under 11 U. S. C. §542 for the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2020, Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2020. Fulton is an easily readable decision and concurrence that highlights good policy reasons to help debtors, but unfortunately the holding provides little to no help for debtors. 19-357 (U.S. Supreme Court, Jan. 14, 2021). Hence, when a creditor has taken possession of a debtor’s property, §362(a)(3) does not require the creditor to return the property upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. We use cookies to give you the best online experience. . No. The language used in §362(a)(3) suggests that merely retaining possession of estate property does not violate the automatic stay. The City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton’s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. One hundred days is a long time to wait for a creditor to return your car, especially when you need that car to get to work so you can earn an income and make your bankruptcy-plan payments. 2019); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary 25 (2d ed. . Had Congress wanted to make §362(a)(3) an enforcement arm of sorts for §542(a), the least one would expect would be a cross-reference to the latter provision, but Congress did not include such a cross- reference or provide any other indication that it was transforming §362(a)(3). In view of the uncertainty relating to whether or when Section 362(a)’s other provisions might require turnover, Fulton may give a creditor (with a lien on property it repossesses pre-bankruptcy) additional leverage to insist upon suitable protections in exchange for returning the estate property to the debtor or trustee. For a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to succeed, therefore, the debtor must continue earning an income so he can pay his creditors. Such protections might include periodic payments to compensate the creditor for any future depreciation in the property’s value during the bankruptcy, maintenance of adequate insurance coverage, or other relief, to increase the likelihood that the creditor will be repaid for its collateral’s value. To “exercise” in the sense relevant here means “to bring into play” or “make effective in action.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 795 (1993). The City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton’s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. Any ambiguity in the text of §362(a)(3) is resolved decidedly in the City’s favor by the existence of a separate provision, §542, that expressly governs the turnover of estate property. ; a deed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 30 (11th ed. as Amici Curiae 17, and interfering not only with debtors’ ability to earn an income and pay their creditors but also with their access to childcare, groceries, medical appointments, and other necessities. The Court of Appeals affirmed all of the judgments in a consolidated opinion. It concluded that merely retaining possession of estate property during bankruptcy does not violate Section 362(a)(3). City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton et al. . 81 (counsel for the City stating that “[i]n most bankruptcy courts, if a creditor responds to a motion [for turnover] by” arguing that the debtor should have instituted an adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy judge will ask whether the creditor received “actual notice”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 32 (reporting that “some courts have granted [turnover] orders based solely on a motion”); but see, e.g., In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F. 3d 115, 128–131 (CA3 2019) (holding that debtors must seek turnover through adversary proceedings). Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. The automatic stay serves the debtor’s interests by protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also benefits creditors as a group by preventing individual creditors from pursuing their own interests to the detriment of the others. 19–357. Respondents and their amici contend that §542(a) would still perform some work by specifying the party to whom the property in question must be turned over and by requiring that an entity “account for . Following this amendment, Chicago refused to return impounded vehicles to their owners if t The better interpretation, the Court concluded, is that Section 362(a)(3) prohibits collection efforts outside of the bankruptcy case that would change the status quo, while Section 542(a) operates within the bankruptcy case “to draw far-flung estate property back into the hands of the debtor or trustee.” Also, the Court observed that interpreting Section 362(a)(3) as a “turnover” provision would render its and Section 542(a)’s commands contradictory. On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in the case of City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, et al., 592 U.S. ____ (2021) which dealt with the interplay between several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to the retention of property of the bankruptcy estate post-bankruptcy that had been retained by the creditor pre-bankruptcy pursuant to … ___. Ct. ED Pa. 2010); see generally 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7065.02 (16th ed. . In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916 (CA7 2019). As respondents point out, omissions can qualify as “acts” in certain contexts, and the term “ ‘control’ ” can mean “ ‘to have power over.’ ” Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F. 3d 699, 702 (CA7 2009) (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 272 (11th ed. At the time, §362(a)(3) applied the stay only to “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate.” Id., at 2570. Each respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and requested that the City return his or her vehicle. But saying that a person engages in an “act” to “exercise” his or her power over a thing communicates more than merely “having” that power. The filing of a petition also automatically “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy forum, §362(a), including “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,” §362(a)(3). CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ROBBIN L. FULTON, et al. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in City of Chicago v. Fulton, concerning how impoundment interacts with bankruptcy procedure. Section 541 is intended to include within the estate any property made available by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. The debtor, in turn, must be able to provide the creditor with “adequate protection” of its interest in the returned property, §363(e); for example, the debtor may need to demonstrate that her car is sufficiently insured. Ct.) January 18, 2021. Business Law Business Law Insolvency Law Committee Case Updates. As a result, Peake’s car remained in the City’s possession for months. The following can be attributed to Nusrat Choudhury, Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois: “The Supreme Court’s decision in the Fulton v.Chicago case is a real disappointment and fails to recognize that states and cities, including Chicago, are crushing residents with exorbitant fines and fees in order to balance the budgets. 2019). Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. § 362(a)(3), which operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. . Although seized vehicles were an issue in Fulton, the Court’s analysis and decision arguably apply much more broadly – to any creditor with a lien on any property that it repossesses or seizes before a debtor’s bankruptcy. By: Donald L Swanson The new U.S. Supreme Court’s bankruptcy opinion is City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, et al., Case No. As even the City acknowledges, §542(a) “impose[s] a duty of turnover that is mandatory when the statute’s conditions . Section 542 carves out exceptions to the turnover command. . to exercise control over property of the [bankruptcy] estate.” 11 U. S. C. §362(a)(3). Fulton: The Supreme Court Shifts the Burden to Debtors to Reacquire Their Vehicles CHRISTIAN DE LA OSA—On January 14, 2021, the United States Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Judgment: Vacated and remanded, 8-0, in an opinion by Justice Alito on January 14, 2021. Among the many collection efforts prohibited by the stay is “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” §362(a)(3) (emphasis added). The Court does not decide one way or the other. Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay” of “any act . Such drivers may turn to Chapter 13 bankruptcy for a “fresh start.” Marrama, 549 U. S., at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted).3 But without their vehicles, many debtors quickly find themselves unable to make their Chapter 13 payments. Nor has the Court addressed how bankruptcy courts should go about enforcing creditors’ separate obligation to “deliver” estate property to the trustee or debtor under §542(a). . At the time Chicago v. Fulton was decided, the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits were in the majority of circuits in holding “that the Bankruptcy Code’s turnover provisions requires immediate turnover of estate property that was seized pre-petition and that failure to do so violates the automatic stay.” Chicago seized the cars of three individuals for unpaid tickets or for driving on a license suspended for unpaid tickets. . The following timeline details key events in this case: 1. In June 2018, when the City impounded Peake’s car for unpaid parking and red-light tickets, the vehicle was worth just around $4,300 (and was already serving as collateral for a roughly $7,300 debt). By agreeing you accept the use of cookies in accordance with our cookie policy. The Court wrote that, taken together, the most natural reading of the statute’s words – the “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” – is that Section 362(a)(3) “prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was filed.” Therefore, something more than passively retaining possession is required to violate the statute (such as, for example, selling the repossessed or seized property during the bankruptcy, without prior bankruptcy court approval). A second automatic consequence of the filing of a bankruptcy petition is that, with certain exceptions, the petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to collect from the debtor outside of the bankruptcy forum. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ROBBIN L. FULTON, et al. The history of the Bankruptcy Code confirms what its text and structure convey. 2. NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. Surely, Peake’s vehicle would have been more valuable in the hands of its owner than parked in the City’s impound lot.1. By denying Peake access to the vehicle he needed to commute to work, the City jeopardized Peake’s ability to make payments to all his creditors, the City included. as Amici Curiae 11–16, 31–32. Fulton: Everything You Need to Know about the January 2021 SCOTUS Decision was last modified: January 15th, 2021 by Megan McLachlan Taken together, the most natural reading of these terms is that §362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was filed. City of Chicago, Illinois, vs. Fulton (U.S. Sup. 1934) (“that which is done,” “the exercise of power,” “a deed”). Under respondents’ reading, an entity would be required to turn over property under §362(a)(3) even if that property were exempt from turnover under §542. See Sanchez & Kambhampati, Driven Into Debt: How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists Into Bankruptcy, ProPublica Illinois (Feb. 27, 2018) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov). In so con cluding, we relied on a plain reading of §§ 363(e) and 542(a) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Whiting Pools. The City filed an unsecured proof of claim, and the bankruptcy court confirmed Fulton’s plan. Fulton could also lead to a massive expansion of the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), which held, for the first time, that … 3 The 10-year period from 2007 to 2017, for instance, saw a tenfold increase in the number of Chicagoans filing Chapter 13 bankruptcies that involved debt to the City. property” as “adversary proceedings.” Rule 7001(1). The City refused, and in each case, the bankruptcy court held that the City violated the stay. On January 14, 2021, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of City of Chicago, Illinois v.Fulton that the mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate 11 U.S.C. See §§542(c), (d). I join the Court’s opinion because I agree that, as used in §362(a)(3), the phrase “exercise control over” does not cover a creditor’s passive retention of property lawfully seized prebankruptcy. Regardless of whether the City’s policy of refusing to return impounded vehicles satisfies the letter of the Code, it hardly comports with its spirit. The phrase “or to exercise control over property of the estate” was not added until 1984. Under that provision, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chicago v. Fulton , holding that mere retention of a debtor’s property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate the automatic stay provided by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 19-357 (S.Ct. . any property made available to the estate by other provi-sions of the Bankruptcy Code.” United States. Here, each respondent filed a bankruptcy petition and requested that the city of Chicago (City) return his or her vehicle, which had been impounded for failure to pay fines for motor vehicle infractions. ‘acts’ that ‘exercise control’ over, but do not ‘obtain possession of,’ the estate’s property, e.g., a creditor in possession who improperly sells property belonging to the estate”). The Supreme Court vacated that decision. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed those judgments in a consolidated opinion. When a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code protects the debtor’s interests by imposing an automatic stay on efforts to collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy forum. An “act” is “[s]omething done or performed . Because adversary proceedings require more process, they take more time. The question before the Court was whether an entity violates §362 (a) (3) by retaining possession of a debtor’s property after a bankruptcy petition is filed. Each of the debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case and demanded the return of his or her vehicle. to exercise control” in §362(a)(3) to include merely retaining possession of a debtor’s property would make that section a blanket turnover provision. Reading “any act . Respondents would have us resolve the conflicting commands by engrafting §542’s exceptions onto §362(a)(3), but there is no textual basis for doing so. The February Supreme Court decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton was widely celebrated in the lending community because the … The prohibition against exercising control over estate property is the subject of the present dispute. He filed for bankruptcy, hoping to recover his vehicle and repay his $5,393.27 debt to the City through a Chapter 13 plan. I write separately to emphasize that the Court has not decided whether and when §362(a)’s other provisions may require a creditor to return a debtor’s property. The first thing that jumps out at me, three pages in, is this: there is no early question from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg! Indeed, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is available only to “individual[s] with regular income.” 11 U. S. C. §109(e). It is up to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to consider amendments to the Rules that ensure prompt resolution of debtors’ requests for turnover under §542(a), especially where debtors’ vehicles are concerned. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit [January 14, 2021] Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 205 (1983). . The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that by retaining possession of the vehicles the City had acted “to exercise control over” respondents’ property in violation of §362(a)(3). When a debtor files for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, as respondents did here, “the debtor retains possession of his property” and works toward completing a court-approved repayment plan. The City’s conduct may very well violate one or both of these other provisions. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. In a concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the result but wrote separately to emphasize what the Court did not decide: namely, whether or when Section 362(a)’s other provisions may require a creditor to return a debtor’s property. In each case, the City’s refusal was held by a bankruptcy court to violate the automatic stay. . City of Chicago v. Fulton – A Summary of the Supreme Court Argument. City of Chicago v. Fulton ... From Data to Decisions. That section requires any “entity,” subject to some exceptions, to turn over “property” belonging to the bankruptcy estate. It is unlikely that Congress would have made such an important change simply by adding the phrase “exercise control,” rather than by adding a cross-reference to §542(a) or some other indication that it was so transforming §362(a)(3). § 362 (a) (3), which operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. Secured creditors cannot opt out of this arrangement. 1 Even though §362(a)(3) does not require turnover, whether and when the City may sell impounded cars is an entirely different matter. Ramos, Chicago Seized and Sold Nearly 50,000 Cars Over Tickets Since 2011, Sticking Owners With Debt, WBEZ News (Jan. 7, 2019) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov). Held: The mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate §362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. On January 14, 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a unanimous ruling in the case City of Chicago, Illinois v.Fulton.The case originated from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit and concerned retained property under the federal Bankruptcy Code. 2 See, e.g., Ramos, Chicago Seized and Sold Nearly 50,000 Cars Over Tickets Since 2011, Sticking Owners With Debt, WBEZ News (Jan. 7, 2019) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov). September 17, 2019: The Such actions are, in simplified terms, “essentially full civil lawsuits carried out under the umbrella of [a] bankruptcy case.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496, 505 (2015). It concluded that, by retaining possession of the vehicles after the debtors filed bankruptcy, the City had “exercised control” over property of their estates in contravention of Section 362(a)(3). See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. 926 F. 3d, at 926, n. 1. Congress, too, could offer a statu tory fix, either by ensuring that expedited review is available for §542(a) proceedings seeking turnover of a vehicle or by enacting entirely new statutory mechanisms that require creditors to return cars to debtors in a timely manner. See Tr. 371. 549 U. S., at 367. Under the Code, an individual injured by any willful violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” §362(k)(1). The history of the Bankruptcy Code confirms the better reading. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. Both §362(a)(3) and §542(a) were included in the original Bankruptcy Code in 1978. “The Supreme Court’s decision in the Fulton v. Chicago case is a real disappointment and fails to recognize that states and cities, including Chicago, are … Under that provision, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. . 3–7. Case no. Pp. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. to exercise control over property” of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Larimer, 27 B. R. 514, 516 (Idaho 1983). . Citizens Bank of Md. Take, for example, respondent George Peake. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Some of those other provisions stay: for example, any act to collect, assess, or recover a pre-bankruptcy claim against a debtor, or any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against estate property. One such provision, §542, is important for present purposes. For one thing, a petition “creates an estate” that, with some exceptions, comprises “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” §541(a)(1). 3. 19-357 (U.S. Supreme Court, Jan. 14, 2021). 19-357) from October 13, 2020.. “The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘ “fresh start” ’ ” to debtors. Shannon presented those theories to the Court of Appeals, but the court did not reach them. The February Supreme Court decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton was widely celebrated in the lending community because the court found that a lender who repossesses a vehicle before a borrower files for bankruptcy is not in violation of the “exercise control” provision of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay section. The better account of the two provisions is that §362(a)(3) prohibits collection efforts outside the bankruptcy proceeding that would change the status quo, while §542(a) works within the bankruptcy process to draw far-flung estate property back into the hands of the debtor or trustee. With that understanding, I concur. Chicago v. Fulton concerns three bankruptcy cases resulting from Chicago’s vast vehicle impoundment program, which is part of this nationwide trend. Most obviously, the Court leaves open the possibility of relief under §542(a). The answer is “no.”. The exceptions to §542(a) shield (1) transfers of estate property made from one entity to another in good faith without notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and (2) good-faith transfers to satisfy certain life insurance obligations. The case arose out of multiple bankruptcies where the debtors’ vehicles were impounded by the City of Chicago for failure to pay fines for motor vehicle infractions. . Nothing in today’s opinion forecloses these alternative solutions. such property”—largely superfluous, even though §542 appears to be the provision governing the turnover of estate property. Nor do we settle the meaning of other subsections of §362(a).2 We hold only that mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate §362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. The filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code automatically “creates an estate” that, with some exceptions, comprises “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U. S. C. §541(a). Knowledge Base Oral arguments in City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fultonwere initially scheduled for April 20, 2020. We do not maintain that these terms definitively rule out the alternative interpretation adopted by the court below and advocated by respondents. Auto Finance Excellence - May 7, 2021. To address this problem, some courts have adopted strategies to hurry things along. 19-357, 2021 WL 125106 (Jan. 14, 2021). 1 Compare In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916, 924 (CA7 2019), In re Weber, 719 F. 3d 72, 81 (CA2 2013), In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F. 3d 1147, 1151–1152 (CA9 1996), and In re Knaus, 889 F. 2d 773, 774–775 (CA8 1989), with In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F. 3d 115, 132 (CA3 2019), and In re Cowen, 849 F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017). . See, e.g., In re Cowen, 849 F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017) (“It’s not hard to come up with examples of . In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916 (CA7 2019). City of Chicago, Illinois, Petitioner v. Robbin L. Fulton, et al. City of Chicago. In Fulton , the city of Chicago (the “City”) impounded four debtors’ cars for failure to … The suggestion conveyed by the combination of these terms is that §362(a)(3) halts any affirmative act that would alter the status quo as of the time of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. The decision is City of Chicago v. Fulton, No. . Titled “Turnover of property to the estate,” §542 provides, with just a few ex- The Supreme Court confronted this precise question in City of Chicago v. Fulton . On January 14, 2021, the United States Supreme Court handed down their decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton, No. Id., at 924–925. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. Section 541 “is intended to include in the estate any property made available to the estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 205 (1983). City of Chicago (Photo by Marilyn Swanson) By: Donald L Swanson So . December 18, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. But Fulton eliminates the risk that passive retention violates Section 362(a)(3). Ultimately, however, any gap left by the Court’s ruling today is best addressed by rule drafters and policymakers, not bankruptcy judges.
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